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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
In this Reply, Petitioner clarifies the applicable standard 
of review of the Decision and Order of the State Tax Commission. 
The evidence cited by the County in its opening Brief regarding 
market rents and carrying capacity is not the substantial 
evidence required to support the Commission's determination that 
Petitioner's appraisal lacks significant data elements and its 
remand for additional evidence. 
The County has not cited contradictory evidence that would 
excuse the Commission's obligation to accept Petitioner's 
uncontradicted evidence as true, nor has the County demonstrated 
that such evidence is inherently improbable. The Commission is 
required to correct the valuation of the subject property in 
accordance with the evidence before it. 
There is no evidence in the record that additional 
information regarding value can be obtained. Remand is futile, 
violating constitutional principles of due process. The 
arbitrary valuation and assessment is a violation of 
constitutional principles of taxation and Petitioner is 
prejudiced by those acts of the Commission. This Court should 
direct the Commission to correct the valuation of Petitioner's 




THE COUNTY HAS MISSTATED THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
The County argues that this Court's decision in Hurley v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commission,, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 
1988) controls this appeal and that, accordingly, the 
Commission's decision is to be accorded deference, being set 
aside only if unreasonable. The County further relies on Xanthos 
v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 
1984) to support its claim that an agency is entitled to broad 
discretion and a presumption that its actions are correct. 
Instead, because this action commenced after the effective date 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act on January 1, 1988, the 
standard of review is that set forth in Morton International v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 37 (Utah 1991). 
In Morton International, this court discussed the effect of 
the Utah Administrative Procedure Act on prior decisions 
regarding judicial review of administrative agency 
determinations. Having reviewed its prior decisions, including 
Hurley, the court stated: 
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory 
construction, the Utah Administrative Procedure Act 
does not change the standard of review when the court 
is in as good a position as the agency to determine the 
issue [correction-of-error standard] or when the agency 
has been granted discretion in interpreting the statute 
[agency's decision will not be disturbed if within the 
bounds of reasonableness]. However, nothing in the 
language of Section 63-46b-16 or its legislative 
- 1 -
history suggests that an agency's decision is entitled 
to deference solely on the basis of agency expertise or 
experience. Indeed, there is no reference to agency 
expertise or experience in the statute or the statute's 
legislative history. Rather, in granting judicial 
relief when an "agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law," the language of Section 63-46b-16(4) 
clearly indicates that absent a grant of discretion, a 
correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an 
agency's interpretation or application of the statutory 
term. 
Therefore, to the extent that our cases can be read as 
granting deference to an agency's decisions based 
solely on the agency's expertise and not on a statutory 
delegation of authority, Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) 
constitutes a break from prior law. 
Morton International
 r 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37. The 
determining factor is not the agency's expertise, but whether the 
legislature has delegated authority to the agency to decide the 
issue. If discretion is explicit or implied from the statutory 
language, the agency decision receives deference and is reviewed 
under a reasonableness standard; absent a grant of discretion, an 
agency's construction of statutory language is not given 
deference and is reviewed for correctness. 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
43, n. 38. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S REMAND FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
IS UNREASONABLE 
A. The Commission's Decision is Not Entitled to Deference Based 
Upon Rule 861-1-7A-L. 
The County argues that the Commission is entitled to 
deference based on the grant of discretion to itself by Rule 861-
1-7A-L of the Utah Administrative Code. This court has clearly 
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stated that only the legislature can confer discretion upon an 
agency. Such deference concerning an agency's statutory 
construction or application exists only where the legislature has 
conferred discretion upon the agency by "an explicit or implicit 
grant of discretion contained in the governing statute." Morton 
International v. Utah State Tax Commission, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 
34, 37 (Utah 1991). An agency cannot invoke its own rule as a 
basis upon which it is entitled to deference. 
In Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance QQ. , 762 P.2d 
1119 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed a 
regulation of the Utah State Insurance Department which 
prohibited stacking of benefits under separate insurance 
policies. The Insurance Department regulation clearly prohibited 
stacking although the Utah legislature had not clearly declared 
policy on that issue. Quoting IML Freightr Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 
P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1975), the court held: "Agency regulations 
may not 'abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the statute creating 
the right or imposing the duty.'" 
Similarly, unless there has been an explicit or implicit 
grant of discretion to the State Tax Commission by the 
legislature, the agency rule which grants discretion cannot be a 
separate basis of authority. 
B. Even if entitled to deference, the Commission's construction 
of "fair market value" should be set aside as unreasonable. 
There is no explicit grant of discretion to the State Tax 
Commission by the legislature to construe the statutory term 
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"fair market value/' but it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Commission has the implicit authority to construe the term so 
long as its construction conforms to the common understanding 
given the term. Id. at 37. 
Nonetheless, the Commission's Decision and Order of March 
28, 1991 must be set aside as unreasonable. First, because the 
Commission rejected Petitioner's adequate and credible evidence 
of market value when the County offered no evidence whatsoever in 
support of its appraised value. Second, the Commission remanded 
the matter for consideration of additional evidence which all 
parties acknowledge as being unavailable. Third, the Commission 
failed to consider the relevant factors set forth in the 
testimony and documentary evidence. This treatment of the 
Petitioners' evidence and the deference given to the County's 
lack of contradictory evidence undermines the rationality of the 
Commission's decision. Thus, the Commission's Decision is 
unreasonable and should be set aside. 
POINT H I 
THE COMMISSION'S ACTION IS BASED ON DETERMINATIONS 
OF FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The County asks this Court to defer to the Commission based 
upon R861--1-7A-L, Utah Administrative Code, and upon a 1984 
decision of this court in which the zoning board was presumed to 
have specialized knowledge in its field. See Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment of Salt Lake Cityf 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
However, section 63-46b-16(4)(g) provides that the factual 
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findings of the Commission receive deference only so long as they 
are based on substantial evidence. In the absence of that 
substantial evidence, as in this case, the Petitioner is entitled 
to relief from the decision and order of the Commission. 
The County raises two factual issues which it claims are 
substantial evidence that Petitioner's appraisal is unreliable. 
The evidence cited in the County's Brief regarding contract rents 
and carrying capacity of the land is not sufficient to support 
the Commission's rejection of Petitioner's appraisal. Neither is 
there substantial evidence to support the Commission's 
determination that Petitioner's appraisal lacked significant 
data. 
A. Contract Rentg. 
The County contends that the taxpayer based the low 
appraisal value on the low contract rents received by the owner. 
The County has not cited a single point which supports the 
Commission's finding that "market rents are significantly higher 
than $.96 per AUM." In fact, there is no evidence at all in the 
record which illustrates how that figure was derived by the 
Commission. The record only states that the BLM and the Forest 
Service value an AUM at $1.81. (T. 22) For that reason, it is 
impossible for Petitioner to marshall any other evidence in 
support of that finding of the Commission. 
The testimony of Edward M. Bown does not, as the County 
contends, contradict the Petitioner's appraisal evidence. The 
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Bown testimony is relevant to the assessment of the property 
based on its highest and best use, (T. 16) The concept of 
highest and best use permits the property owner to use prudence 
and common sense to protect the forage resources and to maximize 
the property's value over the long term. Mr. Bown testified 
that, for conservation purposes, the owner did not demand the 
highest possible rental but opted to promote lighter use of the 
land. This is consistent with the concept of ''best" use. 
Most importantly, the fair market value of this land was 
determined by the taxpayer not by the income method as 
misconstrued by the County and the Commission but instead the 
value was determined by the comparable sales approach. In the 
comparable sales approach, the contract rent under the lease is 
only relevant insofar as it affects the purchase price the 
"willing buyer" would pay for property subject to a lease at the 
contract rate. £££ Northwest Land v. State Tax Appeal Bd. , 661 
P.2d 44, 45 (Mont. 1983). Consequently, evidence of contract 
rents is of limited relevance. 
B. Carrying Capacity* 
The County contends that the Commission correctly found 
Petitioner's appraisal unreliable because Petitioner's expert, 
Steven Wiles, concluded that the BLM and state grazing leases 
projected that the land could support twice as many animals as 
the land's actual capacity. Wiles testified that the landowner 
had not made the use of the grazing capacity of the land as 
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defined by the BLM because the BLM's attribution of grazing 
capacity was overstated, (T. 33-34) Further, the area had been 
in a drought. (T. 29, 36) The County presented no evidence that 
the BLM figures represent the actual capacity of the land. 
C. Significant Data Lacking, 
Petitioner presented to the Commission the only credible 
evidence of fair market value in existence. Nevertheless, the 
Commission rejected that evidence on the basis that it was 
subjective and difficult to support with reliable market data. 
The County argues that the Commission's determination is entitled 
to deference, based upon its specialized knowledge. This 
determination of fact by the Commission must, according to 
Section 63-46b-16(g), be "supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." The 
County has raised only the minor issues of rents and carrying 
capacity and cites no other evidence supporting the determination 
that significant, data is lacking from Petitioner's appraisal. 
In its responsive Brief, the County argues that Petitioner's 
appraisal did not conform to generally accepted appraisal 
practices. Yet, the County cites only to testimony regarding the 
owner's decision to preserve and protect the land by contracting 
for use consistent with the condition of the land and for a 
reasonable rental based on that use. Petitioner presented 
credible and uncontradicted evidence of market value. The minor 
points raised by the County do not constitute the substantial 
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evidence required to support the Commission's determinations that 
market rents exceed contract rents or that there was insufficient 
evidence before the Commission to establish the value of the 
property. Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to relief. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION'S PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES REQUIRE IT TO 
ACCEPT PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE OF FAIR MARKET VALUE AS TRUE 
The testimony of Petitioner's decision to promote the 
highest and best use of the land by contracting for reasonable 
rent does not contradict Petitioner's evidence of fair market 
value. As set forth in Petitioner's opening brief, the evidence 
was that Petitioner's contract rents were comparable to the lease 
rents on the properties identified as comparable sales. (R. 22; 
R. 23) 
The evidence in Petitioner's appraisal and the testimony of 
its expert witness were consistent and uncontradicted. Thus, 
Petitioner met its burden of proof and the Commission was 
required by its own prescribed procedures to assess the property 
upon Petitioner's appraised market value. 
PQXNT V 
THE COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO CORRECT THE BOARD'S 
VALUATION AND ASSESSMENT AND REMAND FOR FURTHER 
EVIDENCE DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS 
AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
The County dismisses Petitioner's constitutional arguments 
as hysterical, incredible, bizarre and inflammatory but fails to 
address the legal issues raised. Petitioner's property was 
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arbitrarily assigned a value and assessed on that value, a 
violation of the constitutional requirement that taxation of 
property be uniform and based on market value. Although 
Petitioner protested and offered uncontradicted evidence of 
lesser value, the Commission refused to correct the arbitrary 
valuation. There is no evidence in the record that additional 
information regarding value can be obtained on remand, yet the 
Commission demands that the parties nevertheless produce 
additional evidence. The remand is futile, violating 
constitutional principles of due process. 
The Decision and Order of the Commission results in 
prejudice to the Petitioner by delay, additional expense, and the 
risk of confiscatory rollback taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above and in Petitioner's opening brief, 
this Court should direct the Commission to correct the valuation 
of Petitioner's property for assessment and taxation purposes, as 
requested by Petitioner. 
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